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The U.S.-Canada Border: Benefits of an “External Perimeter” Strategy
John C. Taylor, Ph.D., and Douglas Robideaux, D.B.A.
Department of Marketing, Seidman School of Business

Introduction
he U.S. and Canada are the world’s two largest trading partners,
and both experienced rapid growth in trade volumes over the
last decade. And while much of the trade growth can be
traced to the NAFTA and predecessor U.S.-Canada FTA, the
NAFTA itself did little to liberalize or modernize border crossing or
customs processes. In fact, while the border is often referred to as
the longest undefended boundary in the world, the customs
processes and border crossing strategies that are used to manage
the border are still rooted in a system that was originally developed
to collect customs duty and control the flow of people. These
border processes and strategies have a significant cost impact on
the economies of the two countries. At the same time, a number of
observers have questioned the degree of security that the current
system can provide given the level of trade and personal traveler
interaction across the border. This article reports on the results of
ongoing research aimed at estimating the cost impacts of the border
and explores an approach to gradually opening the border.

T

U.S.-Canada and Michigan-Canada Trade and Transportation
Trade between the U.S. and Canada is, of course, the largest
bilateral trading relationship in the world, with 2000’s total trade
in goods and services of US$489 billion being some 52% greater
than the trade with the U.S.’s number two trade partner, Japan.
U.S.-Canada trade has grown by 152%, or 13.8% per year since
implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in
1989. U.S. exports of goods to Canada totaled US$178.9 billion in
2000, or some 23% of all U.S. exports. The U.S. market is even
more important to Canada’s economy, with exports to the U.S. in
2000 totaling US$230.8 billion and representing 87% of all
Canadian exports. Levels of foreign direct investment and personal
travel also reflect a high level of integration between the two
economies. This trade, investment, and personal travel result in a
great deal of border crossing activity. In 2001, 68.3 million personal
vehicles crossed the U.S.-Canada border along with 13.4 million
trucks. And while personal vehicle travel was down from a peak of
77.5 million units in 1995, commercial traffic grew 29.7%
between 1995 and 2001.
Michigan accounts for a major portion of all trade activity between
the U.S. and Canada, and the trading relationship is critical to the
state’s economy overall and to many regions of the state, such as
the Greater Grand Rapids area. In 2000 Michigan-Canada trade
totaled US$69.7 billion with two-way trade in finished vehicles
and parts totaling US$53 billion. In addition to autos and parts,
Michigan exported US$242 million of furniture and fixtures, a
good part of which likely originated in the Greater Grand Rapids
area. Michigan’s role in cross-border trade is actually far greater
than what is reflected in Michigan origin- or destination-based

trade because the state also serves as a gateway for other states’
trade with Canada. In 2000 land based trade through the ports of
Detroit and Port Huron alone totaled US$154 billion, meaning
there was at least another US$84.3 billion of indirect trade that
crossed Michigan. This land-based trade included moves on 4.8
million trucks that crossed the border at Detroit and Port Huron.
While trade and
truck traffic increased
dramatically between
1995 and 2000, the
events of 9/11 have
spurred a decline in
the level of borderwide trade and truck
traffic. In addition,
personal vehicle traffic, which had been
growing in recent
years, is down 15.0% since 9/11. Figure 1 shows U.S. economic
activity, imports from Canada by land, and inward truck moves for
each of nine months pre-9/11 compared to the same nine months
post-9/11. On a cumulative level, while the U.S. industrial production index was at the same level at the end of both nine-month
periods, and auto production was actually up 4.24% in the U.S.,
imports of goods by land from Canada fell 10.8%, and truck traffic
entering the U.S. fell 2.2%. This fall-off in Canadian exports to the
U.S. by land will be of considerable concern in Canada where a
number of trade associations expressed fears that post-9/11 perceptions of border delays and uncertainty might have this effect.
The fact that Canadian exports fell 10.8% despite flat economic
activity may in part be due to U.S. industrial buyers’ concerns
about the costs of the border now and in the future. But what are
the cost impacts of the border?
Costs of the Border
Figure 2 on page 15, provides a summary of the estimated
minimum, midrange, and maximum levels of various border
crossing costs. These costs are for the combined economies of
Canada and the U.S. and are for a calendar year. In total, costs for
all delay, uncertainty, and other border related costs are estimated
at a midrange point of US$10.293 billion. This cost estimate was
developed following a research project in which numerous border
crossing site visits were made, and in which some 173 interviews
were conducted, and hundreds of secondary sources were
reviewed. Specifically, delay and uncertainty related costs are
estimated to total US$4.014 billion. For carriers the total
midrange cost impact is estimated at US$1.867 billion. Primary
inspection booth delays are estimated to have a cost of US$324.2
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million, while secondary yard processing times cost another
US$755.4 million. Other major costs included excess time built
into route plans, documentation preparation time, and the need
for additional equipment and drivers due to reduced cycle
times. Another major category of cost impact from delays and
uncertainty is on manufacturers who suffer reductions in productivity because of reduced sourcing from Canada. These lost
productivity benefits are estimated at US $1.53 billion per year.
These reductions in Canadian sourcing are thought to be at least
in part due to buyer perceptions about the level of delays and
uncertainty on the border.
Other major costs of the border, but not related to delays, are
estimated at US$6.279 billion. For carriers the midrange estimate
is a cost impact of US$350 million. These costs relate to administration of border crossing processes to “cabotage” costs. U.S.
cabotage regulations, in the form of U.S. Customs and
Immigration rules, prohibit Canadian drivers from making
domestic freight moves in the U.S. Other border related costs
include an estimated US$5.358 billion paid by manufacturers
for brokerage fees, duty, and managing customs processes.
Customs administration and brokerage fees alone are estimated
at US$3.752 billion. Duties and fees are estimated at US$1.605
billion including recent softwood lumber duties. A final border
cost is for federal inspection services staffs. These costs are
estimated at US$571.5 million for personnel costs alone.
Alternative Border Management Strategies
Many of the border impact costs described above are a direct
result of the border management strategy that has been employed
on the U.S. border over the last 75 years. That strategy has
involved a relatively wide-open border along most of the 5,500
miles, with relatively few checkpoints and many unguarded roads,
Figure 1

trails, and river crossings. At many road crossings in rural areas,
checkpoints shut down at night and a red cone is put in the road
with a roadside sign instructing that persons should check in at
some other point or return during the day. In other more urbanized
areas, suburban streets run down the side of the border. Crossing
the border in these areas is as easy as stepping out of the backyard
into the street. At the same time, traffic crossing the border at
some 130 border crossing checkpoints is lined up and each
vehicle and its passengers are inspected. However, the volume
of vehicles at peak times at some crossings, often exceeding 700
personal vehicles per hour and 400 trucks per hour, makes
anything but cursory inspections difficult.
Given the level of cross-border travel and the backups and delays
that border checkpoints create, it may be time to rethink the way
the border is managed. The current system does very little to
enhance security significantly, yet creates chokepoints and a variety
of border crossing cost impacts. Is there a better way that can
assure security and facilitate trade?
One of the key options is an “external perimeter” strategy that
would replace the current border management system with more
effective external border checks at the perimeter while reducing
controls at the U.S.-Canada border and replacing routine checks
with random inspections. This strategy would place the emphasis
on border security at the U.S. and Canadian external border and
reduce the emphasis on the U.S.-Canada border itself where levels
of interaction and commerce make it almost impossible to provide
effective security. Such a policy would require Canada and the U.S.
to harmonize some immigration policies on the scrutiny and
admissibility standards of immigrants, refugees, and foreign visitors.
An external perimeter strategy would also require Canada and the
U.S. to more closely cooperate on immigration and customs
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Figure 2

Summary of Border Crossing Impacts
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)
Assumption/Scenario

Minimum

Midrange

Maximum

Primary Delays

275.3

324.2

351.8

Secondary Delays

602.5

755.4

908.3

Excess Plan Time

113.7

416.4

515.7

65.8

120.7

197.4

133.5

250.7

400.9

1190.8

1867.4

2374.1

1007.0

1530.0

2000.0

229.0

458.0

686.0

1236.0

1988.0

2686.0

96.7

159.0

209.6

2523.5

4014.4

5269.7

200.0

350.0

583.3

Manufacturer

4340.4

5358.0

6375.2

Federal Staff

452.9

571.5

960.9

General Border Costs

4993.3

6279.5

7919.4

Total Border Impact Costs

7516.8

10293.9

13189.1

Delay/Uncertainty Related
Carrier

Reduced Cycles/Other
Driver Documentation/Fax Time
Carrier Subtotal
Manufacturer
Lost Manufacturer Sourcing Benefits
Extra Inventory Carrying Costs
Manufacturer Subtotal
Personal Traveler
Delay/Uncertainty Subtotal
General Border Costs
Carrier

enforcement offshore and at our external borders—changes that
are currently in process to some degree. However, it would not be
necessary to harmonize all immigration policies, or to harmonize
monetary systems or other domestic policies such as those on gun
control, illegal drugs, and the like. Nor would it be necessary to
eliminate all remaining trade restrictions between the U.S. and
Canada, although such a goal would be beneficial to both
economies in the long run. The key to being able to reduce
scrutiny at the border without harmonizing all policies is the ability
to build a robust system of random inspections and post-audits of
the companies that conduct the bulk of trade across the border,
and a system of severe penalties for corporate or personal violators
of each country’s domestic laws.
An “external perimeter” strategy could have a long-term goal of
bringing the U.S.-Canada border to a level of “openness” similar to
what is seen on European Union internal borders without the
need for total harmonization of all policies. Such a system could
be phased in with a ramping up of external border controls and

post-audit procedures and a gradual loosening of the U.S.-Canada
border with initially high random inspection rates and eventual
reduction of inspections to an almost free-flow state. The benefits
of such a system would be significant. First, there is the potential
to save the US$10.293 billion per year in the costs of the current
system. Secondly, there is an opportunity to actually increase
security be redeploying the money spent on U.S.-Canada border
guards to the external border, to intelligence activities, and to postaudit inspections where a more effective job can be done. While
there has been little discussion of such changes in policy on the
U.S. side of the border, there has been considerable discussion in
Canada about the potential for an external perimeter strategy. In
fact, one recent Windsor newspaper editorial suggested the
Canadian government should seriously explore a European Union
style border arrangement with the U.S.1 Should the U.S. and
Canada want to maintain their current levels of integration, while
enhancing security efforts against terrorism, it may be time to
consider dramatic changes in the way we manage the border.

1 “Perimeter Border for North America [editorial],” The Windsor Star, December 11, 2002.
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